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Abstract 
We document frequency distribution of 4315 two-party, non-equity alliances undertaken by the U.S. 
based firms between 1986 and 2015 in 11industries and find that on an aggregate basis, the firms which 
form multiple alliances based on the exploitation motive are as likely to enter into alliance as the firms 
that enter into multiple alliances based on the exploration motive. However, we find strong evidence 
that the firms that enter into alliances on three or more occasions are driven by the exploration motive 
while firms that enter into alliances one and one or two times are driven by the exploitation motive.  The 
average cumulative abnormal returns (ACAR) for all of the three subsamples of firms that undertook 
one, one or two, and three or more alliances during the time period for this study are all positive but 
exhibit a declining trend.  Firms that are larger in terms of total assets engage more frequently in 
alliances than smaller firms.  Returns to firms that enter into three or more alliances are sensitive to the 
leverage employed and the likelihood of bankruptcy whereas returns to firms that enter into only one or 
one or two alliances are affected significantly by the considerations of competitive forces. 
Keywords: Strategic Alliance; Performance; Exploration; Exploitation; Inter-industry studies 
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Introduction 
In recent years, the valuation implications of strategic alliances have been the object of several empirical 
research papers in finance (Chan et al., 1997; Chen et al., 2013; Palia et al., 2008; Chen et al., 2015; Chou 
et al., 2014).   On average, alliances yield positive gains to the partnering firms. In particular, the returns to 
both stockholders and bondholders around the announcement of strategic alliances indicate that such 
alliances – different from joint ventures1 - result, on average, in positive gains for both stockholders (Chan et 
al. 1997; Chen et al. 2013) and bondholders (Chen et al. 2015; Chou et al. 2014).   
Firms seeking to strengthen their position in the global marketplace frequently engage in alliances (Albers, 
Wohlegezogen, and Zajac, 2016; Kale and Singh, 2009; Kumar and Das, 2007; Lavie and Rosenkopf, 2006; 
Majchrzak, Jarvenpaa, and Bagherzadeh, 2015).  Embedded between organic growth or outsourcing at one 
end and outright mergers and acquisitions on the other, alliances provide firms a viable alternative to reduce 
costs, enter new markets, lessen operational and strategic risks, and engage in innovation (Yoshino and 
Rangan, 1995).  Strategic alliances allow participating firms to create value, either through the realization of 
synergies (Das, Sen, and Sengupta, 1998) or through innovation (Hamel, 1991).   
Further, alliances enable firms to overcome competitive forces, improve operating efficiency, allocation of 
human and material resources and financial profitability, reduce overall risk of their enterprises and manage 
resource-intensive projects better through the realization of synergistic gains without having to invest material 
resources and technical expertise all on their own (Das and Teng, 1998).  Alliances provide partnering firms 
with flexibility in investment decisions and diminishes the need for control when the target firm brings in more 
resources to the alliance contract (Dessein, 2005). Procedural fairness improves cooperation, operating 
results and has a direct effect on operational outcome (Luo, 1998).  
Even though as a means to organizational realignment strategic alliances have become increasingly popular, 
their failure rate is often high (Das and Kumar, 2011; Kumar, 2014; Ring and Van De Ven, 1994). This 
suggests that the alliances often fail to deliver the desired high value the partners anticipated when they 
entered into an alliance.  Often, the gains from planned ex-ante cooperative strategies and resource 
optimization techniques are not large enough to offset the unanticipated costs which arise on account of 
inefficient integration of the participating firms’ operations. Learning in the context of alliances is difficult to 
quantify since neither alliance benefits nor integration costs are directly observable from outside the firm. 
Yet, success in creating value through alliances does portend possibility that the benefits of alliances will 
outweigh the costs associated with them, lead to a positive learning effect and motivate firms to engage in 
sequential alliances over time. Champagne & Kryzanowski (2007) have documented a reinforcing effect in 
the syndicated loan market, wherein one alliance lead to higher probability of future alliances. 
It is this aspect of alliances we explore in this paper. In particular, we explore to what extent firms participating 
in alliances engaged in multiple alliances over time, the frequency distribution of multiple alliances over time 
for alliances differentiated by variables that determined ex ante their original motivations (explorative, 
exploitative or dual2) for the first alliance, and the valuation implications of multiple alliances undertaken by 
these firms, stratified into subsamples determined by how many alliances partnering firms undertook during 
the time period of the study. Not all alliances are alike; they depend on the industry characteristics and the 
                                                          
1 Several studies have documented the valuation effects of joint ventures between non-financial firms (McConnell and 
Nantell (1985), Crutchley et al. (1991) and Chan et al. (1997)) and financial firms (Gleason et al. (2003), Chiou and 
White (2005), Marciukaityte et al. (2009), and Amici et al. (2013)). All report positive abnormal returns around the 
announcement of alliances and/or joint ventures.     
2March (1991) defines exploitation as " refinement, choice, production, efficiency, selection, implementation, and 
execution" whereas exploration is defined as involving " search, variation, risk taking, experimentation, play, flexibility, 
discovery, and innovation". Exploitation involves building on an organization's existing knowledge base whereas 
exploration involves moving away from the firm's existing knowledge base (Lavie, Stettner, and Tushman, 2010). 
Vagnani (2015) has demonstrated that exploration is positively linked to long run organizational performance whereas 
exploitation purports to leverage gains in the short run.  The dual motive is a combination of both exploitative and 
explorative motives.  
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underlying motivations propelling the participating firms engaging in alliances. Multiple alliances are more 
likely to be reported in industries wherein the motive for alliance is more exploitative than explorative, 
whereas the number is likely to be the smallest when the motive is a combination of explorative and 
exploitative, a scenario that is labeled as the dual motive in Tewari et al., 2019.  Alliances fueled by the 
explorative motive not only have a longer gestational period but also entail more time and resources to 
execute, implement and assess, requiring thereby more time to plan for the next alliance.  Alliances 
undertaken by the exploitative motive are on the other hand driven by short term goals and can be executed 
more frequently thereby leading to a higher probability of multiple alliances over time. March (1991) defines 
exploitation as " refinement, choice, production, efficiency, selection, implementation, and execution" 
whereas exploration is defined as involving " search, variation, risk taking, experimentation, play, flexibility, 
discovery, and innovation". Exploitation involves building on an organization's existing knowledge base 
whereas exploration involves moving away from the firm's existing knowledge base (Lavie, Stettner, and 
Tushman, 2010).  Generally, alliances undertaken with the explorative motive have a longer horizon for 
ascertaining success than alliances propelled by the exploitative motive (Vagnani, 2015).  
We extend the analysis reported in Tewari et al. (2019) and adopt their methodology (a) to ascertain the 
number of alliances from different industries which will be included in our sample; (b) to preselect a set of 
variables that will enable us to classify a priori which of the alliances will be classified as either explorative, 
exploitative or dual motive.  Based on this classification, we test hypotheses with regard to the propensity of 
firms to undertake multiple alliances and analyze the valuation implications for various subsamples of firms 
which undertook multiple alliances during the time period of the study.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Hypotheses for the study are presented in Section II. 
Section III describes the data, sample and the methodology adopted in this study. Section IV presents the 
results and Section V discusses the findings and concludes.   
 
Hypotheses  
Firms engaged in alliances with other firms can always decide to expand on the horizon of their alliances by 
undertaking multiple alliances, either with the same firm or with the other firms. Sequential alliances build 
experience and overall knowledge about the alliance process and can add value to the firm.  But, repetitive 
alliances also increase the frim size and lead to additional integration costs which in the long run can result 
in loss of value rather than gain. Yet, even though success in alliances can lead to a higher probability of 
more alliances in the future, once a firm decides to pursue the alliance route, one failure will most likely not 
influence the firm to abandon its strategy. The decision to pursue alliances is a profound choice by the firms 
where the firms are likely not to abandon this strategy based on one failure alone.  The time lapse between 
alliances are likely to vary between firms.  It is reasonable to assume that alliances fueled by the exploitative 
motive will be relatively quicker to implement than those guided by the explorative motive. Alliances fueled 
by the explorative motive not only involve larger outlays of physical and human capital, they also entail more 
time in terms of negotiations and integrations.   
H1A:  Alliances in industries based on the exploitative motive will be marked more by multiple alliances than 
alliances in industries where they are guided by the explorative motive.  
Prior research on market reactions to announcements of alliances have shown that the average cumulative 
returns are consistently positive (Tewari et al., 2019).  However, valuation implications of multiple alliances 
crucially depend on the market’s perception of the firms’ learning process that accumulates over time, the 
firms’ ability to negotiate terms and commit resources to its advantage relative to the target firms and the 
costs of integration that the partner firms will jointly encounter after the terms of the alliance have been 
enforced.  These attributes are not easy to quantify.  So, we side with conservatism and provisionally 
hypothesize that the value gains around the announcement of alliances is likely, on average, to decline over 
sequential alliance announcements. Here we must note that some firms might post exceptionally superior 
record as they announce multiple alliances over time but we are hypothesizing provisionally that on average 
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the costs of integration is likely to be higher over time and that the average value gains as measured by the 
announcement period abnormal returns will decline with repetitive alliance announcements. 
H1B: The average announcement period abnormal returns for alliances will fall as firms undertake multiple 
alliances over time  
Data, Sample and Methodology 
Data and Sample 
We utilized the SDC data base3 to identify two-party strategic alliances undertaken by U.S. based firms and 
were announced and recorded during the time period 1980 to 2015.4  To be included in the final sample in 
our study, the alliances had to satisfy the following criteria: (a) the alliances had to be completed (b) the 
alliances were restricted to only two party strategic alliance5 (c) both firms were publicly traded firms (d) 
returns data and balance sheet and income statement data for the firms were respectively available on CRSP 
(Center for Research in Security Prices) and COMPUSTAT. The final sample 4940 firms were drawn from 
57 industries as per SDC classification. We further restricted the sample to include completed two party 
strategic alliances by publicly traded firms only in those industries which had more than 100 alliances reported 
in the total sample of 4940 firms. This resulted in a final sample of 4315 completed two party strategic 
alliances by publicly traded firms in 11 of the 57 industries included in the original sample of 4940 firms.    The 
11 industries included in our sample are:(i) business services; (ii) communications equipment; (iii) computer 
and office equipment; (iv) drugs; (v) electronic and electrical equipment; (vi) investment and commodity firms, 
dealers, exchanges; (vii) measuring, medical, photo equipment, clocks; (viii) prepackaged software; (ix) 
telecommunications (x) wholesale trade durable goods; (xi) wholesale trade non-durable goods. 
Since, the objective is to get insights into the motive of alliances within a specific industry which reported a 
significant number of alliances during the time period for the study, we omitted industries in which the number 
of alliances were fewer than 100.6  
Table 1 shows the distribution of total number of 4940 alliances across 57 industries as per the SDC 
classification.  Table 2 lists the distribution of the number of all completed two public firm alliances across 
the 11 industries that were selected by the criteria to be included in the sample (the industry would be required 
to have at least 100 two-party completed alliances) during the period 1986-2015, and the number of sample 
alliance firms available on CRSP and Compustat during the 1986-2015 and 1986-2012 time  
Table 1: Distribution of all two public firm Alliances in industry 
Industry  No. of 
Alliances 
Advertising Services 16 
Aerospace and Aircraft 11 
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing 5 
Air Transportation and Shipping 3 
Amusement and Recreation Services 12 
Business Services 1335 
Chemicals and Allied Products 32 
Commercial Banks, Bank Holding Companies 11 
                                                          
3 The SDC data base relies on information from US Securities and Exchange Commission, industry publications, 
and/or other news sources. The data has information on joint ventures and strategic alliances encompassing research 
and development agreements, marketing and manufacturing agreements, supply agreements and licensing and 
distribution arrangements (Schilling, 1998). 
4 The first reported alliance in the SDC data base is in the year 1986.  
5 The data download from SDC listed both strategic alliances and joint ventures. We have restricted our study to only 
strategic alliances.  
6 The lowest number of alliances within any industry that was omitted was 1 and the highest 40.   
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Communications Equipment 176 
Computer and Office Equipment 152 
Construction Firms 13 
Credit Institutions 30 
Drugs 307 
Educational Services 4 
Electric, Gas, and Water Distribution 17 
Electronic and Electrical Equipment 240 
Food and Kindred Products 19 
Health Services 24 
Hotels and Casinos 7 
Insurance 23 
Investment & Commodity Firms,Dealers,Exchanges 412 
Leather and Leather Products 3 
Legal Services 1 
Machinery 28 
Measuring, Medical, Photo Equipment, Clocks 123 
Metal and Metal Products 13 
Mining 8 
Miscellaneous Manufacturing 31 
Miscellaneous Retail Trade 32 
Miscellaneous Services 2 
Motion Picture Production and Distribution 18 
Oil and Gas; Petroleum Refining 40 
Other Financial 5 
Paper and Allied Products 6 
Personal Services 3 
Prepackaged Software 863 
Printing, Publishing, and Allied Services 14 
 
 
Table 1: Continued……. 
Industry No. of 
Alliances 
Public Administration 38 
Radio and Television Broadcasting Stations 32 
Real Estate; Mortgage Bankers and Brokers 11 
Repair Services 5 
Retail Trade-Eating and Drinking Places 7 
Retail Trade-Food Stores 2 
Retail Trade-General Merchandise and Apparel 9 
Retail Trade-Home Furnishings 22 
Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastic Products 5 
Sanitary Services 1 
Soaps, Cosmetics, and Personal-Care Products 7 
Stone, Clay, Glass, and Concrete Products 3 
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Telecommunications 134 
Textile and Apparel Products 18 
Tobacco Products 1 
Transportation and Shipping (except air) 10 
Transportation Equipment 20 
Wholesale Trade-Durable Goods 448 
Wholesale Trade-Nondurable Goods 125 
Wood Products, Furniture, and Fixtures 3 
Total 4940 
 
periods.  Of the 11 industries represented in the 4315 alliances included in our study, alliances in the 
Business Service industry reported the highest number of alliances (1335) and Measuring, Medical, Photo 
Equipment, Clocks the lowest (123). 
Methodology 
The daily stock returns are calculated by the equation 1: 
 𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖+𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡  + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (1) 
Where, 
 𝑅𝑖𝑡 = the daily return of the stock i on day t. 
 𝑅𝑚𝑡  = the return on the CRSP value-weighted index on day t. 
The expected return ( ?̂?𝑖𝑡 ) for a stock i on day t is represented by equation 2 below: 
 ?̂?𝑖𝑡 = ?̂?𝑖 + ?̂?𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝜀?̂?𝑡 (2) 
For each firm the daily abnormal return (𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡) and the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) are calculated in 
the event window for examining the extent to which the stocks respond to the event. The 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 is calculated 
by equation 3 below: 
 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝑅𝑖𝑡 −  ?̂?𝑖𝑡 (3) 
The CAR is calculated using equation 4: 
 
CAR(𝑡2,𝑡1) =  ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑡
𝑡2
𝑡1
 
(4) 
In our analysis, we considered three subsamples of firms stratified by whether the firms across the 11 
industries undertook only one, one or two, three or more alliance during the time period of our study.  For 
each of the subsample of firms, we computed the average cumulative abnormal returns for the five day (-2, 
+2) window surrounding the announcement of the alliances utilizing an equally-weighted market index within 
the market model framework. We found the average cumulative abnormal returns for the two participating 
firms in the alliance for the 5-day window surrounding the announcement of the alliances in each of the 11 
industries.  We then ran multiple regression analysis for each of the three subsamples with the cumulative 
abnormal returns for the (-2, +2) window as the dependent variable and an array of explanatory and control 
variables. 
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Table 2: Distribution of Alliances by the industry for all industries 
Industry No. of 
Completed 
Two Public 
Firm Alliances 
(1986-2015) 
Sample Alliance 
Firms available 
on CRSP & 
Compustat 
(1986-2015) 
Sample Alliance 
Firms available on 
CRSP & Compustat 
(1986-2012) 
Business Services 1335 1565 1535 
Communications Equipment 176 209 209 
Computer and Office Equipment 152 189 182 
Drugs 307 355 344 
Electronic and Electrical Equipment 240 306 302 
Investment & Commodity Firms, Dealers, Exchanges 412 508 507 
Measuring, Medical, Photo Equipment, Clocks 123 153 148 
Prepackaged Software 863 1125 1115 
Telecommunications 134 152 151 
Wholesale Trade-Durable Goods 448 566 563 
Wholesale Trade-Nondurable Goods 125 145 141 
Total 4315 5273 5197 
 
We propose in this paper four categories of explanatory variables which we hypothesize can contribute to 
the value of strategic alliances.  They are related to (a) the growth options available to the participating firms, 
(b) sources of possible gains from synergy, (c) real options available to the participating firms to combat 
competition and alleviate financial constraints, (d) opportunities for cost and risk reduction available to the 
partnering firm.  We assume that gains to explorative alliances will be better explained by the growth options 
and synergistic benefits variables, and gains to exploitative alliances would correspondingly be better 
explained by factors representing opportunities for alleviating financial constraints, reducing costs and risks 
through alliances.  A total of eight variables were selected in Tewari et al., (2019), three were expected to 
explain returns in alliances fueled by the explorative motive and five for the alliances undertaken for the 
exploitative motive.  All of the eight explanatory variables have been used in prior studies. Specifically, the 
three Variables: Market/Book, Sales Growth %, and R&D/Sales would be expected to influence alliances 
motivated by the explorative motive whereas the five variables: ICCF/Market Cap (Chen et al, 2015), COMP 
(Chou et al., 2014)  , DEF/Sales (Goyal and Frank, 2003), KZ Index (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997), and Op 
Cost/Sales would be expected to influence alliances motivated by the exploitative motive.  
We include in the multiple regression model a control variable for the type of alliance7 – either licensing 
arrangement motivated (LIC) or research and development motivated (RD) – and five other firm specific 
control variables: (a) Total Assets (TA); (b) Leverage ratio; (c) Return on Assets (ROA =Net Income/Total 
Assets); (d) Capital Intensity (plant, property and equipment – PPT/TA)); (e) Cash and Cash Equivalents to 
Total Assets (Cash & Equiv/TA); and (f) Altman Z-score (ALT Z). The Altman Z-score is the output of a credit-
strength test that gauges a publicly traded company's likelihood of bankruptcy. The Altman Z-score, is based 
on five financial ratios that can be calculated from data found on a company's annual 10K report. 8 Low 
scores portend higher bankruptcy likelihood whereas higher scores reflect financial soundness.  Firms with 
higher likelihood of bankruptcy (lower Altman Z-score) are expected to post gains from cooperative 
                                                          
7 The SDC data base flags for the kind of alliance 
8 The Altman Z-score is calculated from the formula:   Z-Score = 1.2A + 1.4B + 3.3C + 0.6D + 1.0E Where: 
A = Working Capital/Total Assets; B = Retained Earnings/Total Assets; C = Earnings Before Interest & Tax/Total 
Assets; D = Market Value of Equity/Total Liabilities; E = Sales/Total Assets. A score below 1.8 means the company is 
probably headed for bankruptcy, while companies with scores above 3.0 are not likely to go bankrupt. The lower/higher 
the score, the higher/lower the likelihood of bankruptcy. 
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arrangements - exploitation or exploration based - and we expect the sign of this independent variable to be 
negative in regression analysis. That is, firms will form alliances when the risk of bankruptcy is high.  
For a more detailed description of each of the variables please see Tewari et al., 2019.  
Empirical results 
We employ the following regression model to empirically test our Hypotheses: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 +  𝛽1 𝐿𝐼𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑅𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖 + 𝛽5 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽6 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑇 𝑖 
+ 𝛽7 (𝐶𝐴&𝐸𝑄/𝑇𝐴)𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐴𝐿𝑇𝑍 𝑖+ 𝛽9 (𝑀/𝐵)𝑖 + 𝛽10 (𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝐺%)𝑖 +𝛽11 (𝑅&𝐷/𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆)𝑖 
+ 𝛽12 (𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐹/𝑀𝐾𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑃) 𝑖+ 𝛽13 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽14 (𝐷𝐸𝐹/𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆)𝑖 + 𝛽15 𝐾𝑍𝑖 
+ 𝛽16(𝑂𝑃𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇/𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆)𝑖 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖                                                                                                 (5) 
Distribution of the number of alliances in three subsamples of firms engaging in multiple alliances 
Tables 3 through 5 present the annual distribution of number of alliances for firms in each of the 11 industries 
from 1986 to 2015 depending respectively on whether the firms entered into alliance only one time (Table 3), 
one or two times (Table 4), and three or more times (Table 5). Clearly, firms in the Business Services industry, 
which has the highest number of firms represented in the original sample, also has the highest number of 
firms represented in the three subsamples.  Also, firms in the Prepackaged Software industry, which has the 
second highest number of firms represented in the original sample, has the second highest number of firms 
represented in the three subsamples.   
Table 6 presents the summary of distribution of firms in subsamples of firms which engaged in alliance only 
one time, one or two times, and three or more times. The firms are classified according to the motives for 
which the firms entered into alliances and the industries they belonged to.  The categorization based on the 
motives for the industries is adapted to the analysis reported in Tewari et al., 2019.  The evidence presented 
in Tables 3 through 6 indicate convincingly that multiple alliances are common among firms which engage 
Table 3: Annual distribution of number of Alliances by the industry for firms with alliance only one time 
Year Business 
Services 
Communications 
Equipment 
Computer 
and Office 
Equipment 
Drugs Electronic 
and 
Electrical 
Equipment 
Investment & Commodity 
Firms,Dealers,Exchanges 
1986 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1987 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1988 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1989 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1990 5 1 1 0 2 6 
1991 8 0 3 1 0 4 
1992 4 1 2 4 1 1 
1993 2 3 2 5 5 1 
1994 3 0 1 4 2 0 
1995 7 0 3 5 4 5 
1996 8 1 3 4 3 1 
1997 12 5 3 4 7 4 
1998 10 3 2 2 2 23 
1999 40 1 1 4 3 16 
2000 35 0 0 0 1 2 
2001 15 0 0 0 0 4 
2002 9 1 0 2 0 1 
2003 12 0 0 2 0 2 
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2004 8 0 0 1 1 5 
2005 25 0 0 0 1 9 
2006 16 0 0 0 0 6 
2007 31 1 0 0 0 6 
2008 18 0 0 0 1 4 
2009 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2010 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2011 1 0 0 1 0 0 
2012 4 0 0 1 0 0 
2013 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2014 6 0 1 2 0 0 
2015 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 279 17 22 44 33 100 
 
Table 3: Continued… 
Year Measuring, 
Medical, Photo 
Equipment; 
Clocks 
Prepackaged 
Software 
Telecommunications Wholesale 
Trade-
Durable 
Goods 
Wholesale 
Trade-
Nondurable 
Goods 
Total 
1986 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1987 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1988 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1989 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1990 0 1 0 0 0 16 
1991 0 1 0 1 3 21 
1992 8 3 1 9 2 36 
1993 3 5 2 15 3 46 
1994 3 6 1 9 5 34 
1995 4 9 3 6 4 50 
1996 1 12 2 12 4 51 
1997 11 27 2 4 7 86 
1998 2 7 3 4 3 61 
1999 3 8 3 4 2 85 
2000 0 10 4 1 0 53 
2001 0 6 0 1 1 27 
2002 1 4 2 0 0 20 
2003 0 3 0 5 2 26 
2004 0 3 1 1 0 20 
2005 0 2 1 6 0 44 
2006 0 2 0 3 1 28 
2007 2 5 0 4 1 50 
2008 0 1 0 2 1 27 
2009 0 1 0 1 0 2 
2010 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2011 0 0 0 0 1 3 
2012 2 2 1 0 1 11 
2013 1 2 0 1 0 4 
2014 0 0 0 0 2 11 
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2015 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 41 120 26 89 43 814 
 
in alliances. Based on the results presented in Table 6, we obtain the following summary indicating firms 
which engaged exactly in one and two alliances in Table 7.   
Alliances driven by the explorative motive are comparable to the alliances driven by the exploitative motive 
in terms of the number of alliances reported by each category during the time period of the study. So we are 
unable to affirm the hypothesis that alliances propelled by the exploitative motive will report more  
Table 4: Annual distribution of number of Alliances by the industry for firms with alliance one or two times 
Year Business 
Services 
Communications 
Equipment 
Computer and 
Office 
Equipment 
Drugs Electronic 
and Electrical 
Equipment 
Investment & Commodity 
Firms,Dealers,Exchanges 
1986 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1987 0 0 0 2 0 0 
1988 2 0 0 1 0 0 
1989 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1990 11 1 1 0 2 10 
1991 17 0 4 1 2 10 
1992 10 3 3 6 3 1 
1993 7 3 3 11 7 1 
1994 4 4 2 13 3 0 
1995 11 3 5 11 5 5 
1996 11 3 4 10 11 2 
1997 18 10 4 11 8 6 
1998 26 3 7 4 4 34 
1999 66 1 1 7 4 22 
2000 51 0 0 1 3 4 
2001 17 0 0 1 0 6 
2002 15 1 0 2 0 1 
2003 21 0 0 2 0 7 
2004 12 0 0 1 2 6 
2005 33 1 0 0 2 13 
2006 27 0 0 1 1 10 
2007 44 2 0 0 1 11 
2008 27 0 0 0 2 7 
2009 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2010 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2011 2 0 0 2 0 0 
2012 5 0 0 2 0 1 
2013 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2014 9 0 1 3 0 0 
2015 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 447 35 35 92 60 157 
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Table 4: Continued… 
Year Measuring, 
Medical, Photo 
Equipment; 
Clocks 
Prepackaged 
Software 
Telecommunications Wholesale 
Trade-
Durable 
Goods 
Wholesale Trade-
Nondurable 
Goods 
Total 
1986 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1987 0 0 0 0 0 2 
1988 0 0 0 0 0 3 
1989 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1990 0 5 0 0 0 30 
1991 0 3 0 2 3 42 
1992 10 6 1 16 7 66 
1993 9 13 2 25 5 86 
1994 9 12 1 16 9 73 
1995 10 20 4 8 8 90 
1996 4 24 3 16 5 93 
1997 13 43 3 7 8 131 
1998 6 14 5 5 3 111 
1999 6 14 6 10 4 141 
2000 0 15 6 2 0 82 
2001 0 7 0 1 1 33 
2002 1 6 2 2 0 30 
2003 0 3 0 6 2 41 
2004 1 4 1 2 1 30 
2005 0 6 2 7 0 64 
2006 0 3 0 6 1 49 
2007 2 6 0 8 1 75 
2008 0 1 0 2 1 40 
2009 0 1 0 1 0 2 
2010 0 1 0 0 0 1 
2011 0 0 0 0 1 5 
2012 2 4 1 0 2 17 
2013 1 3 0 2 0 7 
2014 0 0 0 0 2 15 
2015 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Total 75 214 37 144 64 1360 
 
alliances than those driven by the explorative motive. The numbers are comparable. The numbers in Table 
7 indicate that even though the number of firms reporting only one alliance in the explorative group is higher 
than the exploitative category (370 as opposed to 350), the number of firms reporting two alliances is higher 
for the exploitative group than the explorative group (241 as opposed to 219). On average, the number of 
first two alliances announced by firms driven by the explorative motive do not differ markedly from those  
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Table 5: Annual distribution of no. of Alliances by the industry for firms with alliance three or more times 
Year Busines
s 
Services 
Communication
s Equipment 
Computer 
and Office 
Equipment 
Drugs Electronic 
and 
Electrical 
Equipment 
Investment & Commodity 
Firms,Dealers,Exchange
s 
1986 2 0 0 0 0 0 
1987 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1988 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1989 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1990 41 0 0 2 1 25 
1991 69 14 6 9 6 45 
1992 39 18 26 30 43 0 
1993 42 30 25 29 31 2 
1994 22 29 17 38 46 0 
1995 43 23 12 28 28 3 
1996 48 19 19 21 16 11 
1997 62 15 21 58 32 12 
1998 89 5 12 14 11 75 
1999 157 11 6 9 9 49 
2000 87 1 0 1 2 12 
2001 44 0 0 1 1 10 
2002 42 1 0 2 2 3 
2003 42 0 4 1 0 18 
2004 30 0 0 0 1 11 
2005 49 0 0 0 2 26 
2006 69 3 0 3 1 19 
2007 57 2 0 0 1 16 
2008 49 2 0 0 7 12 
2009 6 0 0 0 0 0 
2010 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2011 4 0 0 3 0 0 
2012 4 1 0 5 2 1 
2013 7 0 0 3 0 0 
2014 13 0 6 5 4 1 
2015 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 1118 174 154 263 246 351 
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Table 5: Continued… 
Year Measuring, 
Medical, Photo 
Equipment; 
Clocks 
Prepackaged 
Software 
Telecommunications Wholesale 
Trade-
Durable 
Goods 
Wholesale 
Trade-
Nondurable 
Goods 
Total 
1986 0 0 0 0 0 2 
1987 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1988 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1989 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1990 2 11 0 0 0 82 
1991 1 34 0 13 3 200 
1992 9 51 9 85 12 322 
1993 7 62 8 95 11 342 
1994 16 83 15 44 23 333 
1995 9 125 13 32 7 323 
1996 4 112 6 52 5 313 
1997 9 161 9 19 9 407 
1998 7 62 17 11 0 303 
1999 5 62 10 11 3 332 
2000 1 40 14 2 0 160 
2001 1 18 1 7 1 84 
2002 1 22 0 3 1 77 
2003 1 10 1 4 1 82 
2004 0 9 1 5 1 58 
2005 0 6 4 11 0 98 
2006 1 19 3 8 1 127 
2007 0 4 0 15 1 96 
2008 0 8 0 3 0 81 
2009 0 2 1 1 0 10 
2010 0 1 0 0 0 2 
2011 0 1 0 0 0 8 
2012 1 1 2 0 0 17 
2013 2 6 0 1 0 19 
2014 0 1 1 0 2 33 
2015 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Total 78 911 115 422 81 3913 
 
propelled by the exploitative motive.9  In contrast, firms motivated to undertake alliances based on the dual 
motive engage in alliances more in the second time around than in the first. Thus, the empirical results do 
not validate Hypothesis 1A; firms engaging in alliances propelled by the exploitative motive do not undertake 
multiple alliances more frequently than firms undertaking alliances guided by the explorative motive. The 
numbers are comparable. 
                                                          
9 It must be pointed out in this context that we have retained the classification of the motive for alliance based on the 
aggregate results reported in Tewari et al., 2019.  Since we are considering multiple alliances in this paper, there is the 
possibility that the motives for the alliances may have changed over time.  That is, after undertaking an alliance for 
the exploitative reasons a firm may have engaged in an alliance for explorative purposes. We are not considering this 
possibility in this paper.  It is assuredly an issue for future research.  
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Table 6: Distribution of firms in the three subsamples of firms in each of the 11 industries 
 
Table 7: Distribution of firms in subsamples of firms in each of the 11 industries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns for the three subsamples 
We stratified the sample by the number of alliances announced by firms during the time period of the study 
into three subsamples: firms which announced one alliance, one or two alliances, three or more alliances. 
We then compute the average cumulative abnormal returns (ACARs) for each of these three subsamples 
around the announcements of alliances. The results are reported in Table 8. While the ACARs increase 
marginally for the one or two alliances sample (1.04%) from the one only alliance sample (0.97%), they 
Motive for Alliance Industry # of Firms with 
One Alliance 
# of Firms 
with One 
or Two 
Alliances 
# of Firms 
with Three 
or More 
Alliances 
Exploration Business Service                                                                279 447 1118 
 Computer and Office Equipment                                                22 35 154 
 Electronic and Electrical Equipment                                          33 60 246 
 Telecommunications  26 37 115 
     
Exploitation 
Investment & Commodity Firms, Dealers, 
Exchanges             100 157 351 
 Measuring, Medical, Photo Equipment, Clocks                         41 75 78 
 Prepackaged Software                                                               120 214 911 
 Wholesale Goods Durable Goods                                               89 144 422 
     
Dual Communications   17 35 174 
 Drugs  44 92 263 
     
Not Clear Wholesale Trade Non-durable 43 64 81 
Motive for Alliance Industry # of Firms 
with One 
Alliance 
# of Firms 
with Two 
Alliances 
Exploration Business Service                                                                279 168 
 Computer and Office Equipment                                                22 13 
 Electronic and Electrical Equipment                                          33 27 
 Telecommunications  26 11 
 Total 360 219 
Exploitation 
Investment & Commodity Firms, Dealers, 
Exchanges             100 57 
 Measuring, Medical, Photo Equipment, Clocks                         41 34 
 Prepackaged Software                                                               120 94 
 Wholesale Goods Durable Goods                                               89 55 
 Total 350 240 
Dual Communications   17 18 
 Drugs  44 48 
 Total 61 66 
Not Clear Wholesale Trade Non-durable 43 21 
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decline for the three or more alliances samples.  The ACARs for all of the three samples are statistically 
significant.  
Table 8: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) distributed by the no. of times firms entered alliance 
# of Alliances 
Entered by the Firm 
# of firms in 
Sample 
Mean CAR Positive:Negative Patell Z Generalized 
Sign Z 
One Only 814 0.97% 488:326>>> 3.914*** 3.881*** 
One or Two 1360 1.04% 884:476>> 2.621** 2.452** 
Three or more 3913 0.58% 2269:1644>> 2.754** 1.881* 
*** denotes significance at 1%, ** denotes significance at 5% level and * denotes significance at 10% level. 
Table 9: Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the empirical analysis 
Variables One Only One or Two Three or More 
  Mean/Sum Median Mean/Sum Median Mean/Sum Median 
LIC (Licensing 
Agreement) 323.00  567.00  2470.00  
RD (R&D Agreement) 207.00  412.00  2149.00  
Total Assets (TA) 13894.67 648.46 13861.67 648.46 25609.71 5474.16 
Leverage 0.18 0.14 0.18 0.13 0.16 0.14 
ROA (NI/TA) 0.78 0.15 0.91 0.16 0.66 0.25 
Capital Intensity 
(PPE/TA) 0.37 0.28 0.38 0.30 0.44 0.36 
Cash & Equiv/TA 0.24 0.15 0.25 0.16 0.24 0.16 
ALT Z 7.99 4.18 9.34 4.39 9.26 4.38 
Market/Book 3.30 1.69 12.63 1.69 3.54 1.77 
Sales Growth % 17.35% 10.27% 18.39% 10.38% 16.27% 10.23% 
R&D/Sales 0.85 0.06 0.99 0.07 0.23 0.10 
ICCF/Market Cap 6.40 0.16 4.40 0.16 2.14 0.12 
COMP 67.00  115.00  114.00  
DEF/Sale 0.12 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.27 0.07 
Op Cost/Sale 2.40 0.87 2.45 0.86 0.96 0.81 
COMP is a binary variable. 
As noted earlier, as firms engage in multiple alliances, they become larger and the integration costs could 
be higher. But based on these results, we are able to conclude that the ACARs are consistently positive over 
time and that the benefits of alliances outweigh the increases in costs multiple alliances entail. Tewari et al., 
2019 looked at alliances in general and reported positive ACARs for the entire sample. In this paper, we are 
reporting the persistence of positive returns over time. 
Identification of the effects of firm specific and control variables on ACARs  
In this section we examine the ACARs for the firms in each of the three subsamples across 11 industries and 
explore by cross sectional regression analysis which of the firm specific and control variables we have 
included in our study contribute significantly to the gains recorded for the firms in each subsample around 
the announcement of the alliances. 
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Table 10: Multivariate regression analysis with CAR as the dependent variable 
 Panel A One Only One or Two Three or More 
Independent Variables Coeff T-Stat Coeff T-Stat Coeff T-Stat 
Constant 3.491* 1.89 3.776*** 3.02 1.776** 2.01 
LIC -1.139 -1.25 -0.594 -0.95 -0.111 -0.34 
RD -0.956 -0.98 -0.368 -0.57 -0.337 -1.10 
Total Assets (TA) -0.349* -1.78 -0.330** -2.43 -0.068 -0.86 
Leverage -1.321 -0.46 -0.864 -0.43 
-
3.527*** -2.61 
ROA (NI/TA) 2.407 1.06 1.254 1.00 -1.778 -1.48 
Capital Intensity (PPE/TA) 1.000 0.65 0.166 0.15 -0.979* -1.81 
Cash&Equiv/TA 0.796 0.32 0.175 0.10 -0.615 -0.64 
ALT Z -0.021 -0.55 -0.029** -2.17 
-
0.020*** -2.72 
Market/Book -0.027 -1.53 -0.029** -2.06 0.014* 1.80 
Sales Growth % 0.407 0.23 -1.032 -0.97 1.847*** 3.06 
R&D/Sales -0.220 -0.29 -0.072 -0.32 -0.675 -1.47 
ICCF/Market Cap 0.004 0.83 0.004 0.91 0.002 0.52 
COMP 4.695** 2.25 3.220** 2.17 1.342 1.38 
DEF/Sale 0.111 0.63 0.001 0.02 -0.038 -0.50 
KZ Index -0.083 -0.09 -0.080 -0.12 0.508 1.62 
Op Cost/Sale 0.040 0.09 0.108 0.61 0.587 1.37 
Industry Dummy Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year Dummy Yes  Yes  Yes  
Adj R-Sq 0.038  0.045  0.021  
All coefficient and t-stat are robust estimates using White’s method, White (1980). *** denotes significance 
at 1%, ** denotes significance at 5% level and * denotes significance at 10% level. 
Table 9 provides the descriptive statistics for each of the independent and control variables we have included 
in this study for the alliance firms in 11 industries from which our three subsamples – depending on how 
many alliances each group of firms announced during the time period of the study - has been drawn. We 
provide the mean and median of each variable listed in Table 9.   
Table 10 reports the coefficient estimates and t-Stats for each of the alliance control variables, firm control 
variables, and the three sets of explanatory variables separately for the alliance firms in each of the three 
subsamples from the regression analysis undertaken for each of the three subsamples. All variables have 
been calculated utilizing data pertaining to the year-end immediately preceding the announcement of the 
alliances.  We consider the firm specific and control variables first.  
The licensing alliance control variable is negative but statistically insignificant for each of the three 
subsamples. The research and development alliance control variable is also negative and statistically 
insignificant for each of the three subsamples implying that alliances motivated by licensing agreements and 
sharing of research and development potentials by the participants results in loss of value for such alliances.  
But the coefficients are not statistically significant.  
The firm control variable Total Assets is statistically significant and negative for firms which undertook one, 
one or two alliances but negative and statistically insignificant for firms which engaged in three or more 
alliances during the sample period. We conclude that as firms became larger, alliances became less 
profitable and infer that alliances favor the smaller firms on average. Leverage is statistically significant and 
negative only for the sample of firms which announced three or more alliances, indicating that leverage 
negatively affected firms when the number of alliances increased beyond three.   Higher leverage in the firms 
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entering into alliance frequently results in lower returns. Return on assets (ROA) is statistically significant 
and negative only for the Drugs industry.  Alliance Firms with higher ROA in Drug industry post lower returns 
likely due to the fact that the firms with higher ROA prior to alliance in the drug industry are not viewed 
favorably after the alliance.  Neither ROA, nor Capital Intensity nor Cash to total Assets is statistically 
significant in any industry. ALT Z is negative and significant for subsamples which engage in frequent 
alliances but not so for firms which undertake only one alliance during the entire time period for the study, 
indicating that the likelihood of bankruptcy becomes a significant variable of consideration when firms engage 
in multiple acquisitions.  Thus, leverage and the likelihood of default are important determinants of the 
success of alliances when firms engage in multiple alliances; the two variables affect the firms negatively.  
We report the results for the effects of variables which have been included as proxies for the alliance motives 
(explorative or exploitative) on the ACARs around the announcement of the alliances. The methodology 
adopted to classify the variables have been detailed in Tewari et al., 2019 and we adapt our selection of 
variables directly to Tewari et al., 2019.  
Identification of the effects of alliance motives on ACARs  
We include eight variables to serve as proxies for the motives for alliances; three to signify the explorative 
motive in alliances and five to reflect the exploitative motive. The variables have been listed and briefly 
described in Appendix A and elaborately explained in Tewari et al., 2019.  
As per Table 10, the Market to Book variable is statistically significant for firms undertaking multiple alliances 
(more than one alliance) but the sign of the coefficient is mixed: negative for one or two, but positive for three 
and more. Thus, when the Market to Book ratio is large firms benefit from multiple acquisitions. Second, the 
Sales Growth variable is a statistically significant determinant of returns when firms engage in more than 
three alliances over the time period of the study.  The Market to Book and Sales Growth variables are 
expected to affect alliances guided more by the explorative motive than the exploitative motive.  
The variable COMP, which assesses the extent of competition faced by firms attempting alliances, is positive 
and statistically significant for firms which attempt one and one or two alliances. As the listing of descriptive 
statistics in Table has shown, the firms attempting one and one or two alliances are smaller in terms of their 
total assets when compared to firms which are attempting three or more alliances.  Evidently, aspects of 
competition encountered is more pertinent for smaller firms engaging in alliances and the returns are higher 
when firms face a greater degree of competition (COMP is a dummy variable and will be equal to 1 under 
such circumstances).  The COMP variable is expected to affect alliances guided more by the exploitative 
motive than the explorative motive.  
Conclusions 
We explore in this paper the frequency distribution of 4315 two-party, non-equity alliances undertaken by 
U.S. based firms between 1986 and 2015 in select 11 industries determined by the criteria set in Tewari et 
al., 2019.  Our goal is to document the pattern of multiple alliances undertaken by firms. We adapt the 
explorative and exploitative motives for undertaking alliances in our analysis based on the results reported 
in Tewari et al., 2019 and hypothesize that firms guided by the exploitative motive will undertake greater 
numbers of alliances than firms which are guided by the explorative motive.  We find that in the aggregate, 
the firms which are propelled to form alliances based on the exploitative motive are as likely as firms which 
entered into alliances based on the explorative motive to undertake multiple alliances. However, firms which 
engage in alliances on three or more occasions during the entire time period appear to have been driven 
more by the explorative motive whereas firms which undertake alliances one and one or two times only 
appear to have been driven more by the exploitative motive.  Firms that are larger in terms of total assets 
engage more frequently in alliances than smaller firms.   
We explore in this paper the announcement-period cumulative abnormal returns for the three samples of two 
party alliances undertaken during the 1986-2015 period by firms in eleven industries.  The average 
cumulative abnormal returns (ACAR) for all of the three subsamples of firms that undertook one, one or two, 
and three or more alliances during the time period for this study are all positive but exhibit a declining trend.  
Returns are lower for firms which engage in multiple alliances. 
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To gain additional insight into the average announcement period returns reported by the firms in eleven 
industries included in the three subsamples, we perform cross-sectional regressions for each of the three 
subsamples with the (-2, +2) window average cumulative abnormal return as the dependent variable and 
eight independent variables under four categories – growth options, synergy, competition and financial 
constraints, and opportunity for cost and risk reduction - along with select firm-level and alliance-type control 
variables.  Each of the eight independent variables has been adopted as an explanatory variable in prior 
studies (as detailed in the Appendix) and all of the eight variables are included in Tewari et al., 2019.   
Returns to firms that engaged in three or more alliances are sensitive to the effects leverage and the 
likelihood of bankruptcy whereas returns to the firms which undertake only one or one or two alliances are 
affected significantly by considerations of competitive forces.  We infer from this evidence that as firms 
engage in alliances greater in numbers, they become large, and concerns about leverage and bankruptcy 
become more pertinent.  
The Market to Book and Sales Growth variables are expected to affect alliances guided more by the 
explorative motive than the exploitative motive. These two variables significantly affect the returns to firms 
which engage in three or more alliances during the time period for the study.  As such, multiple alliances are 
relying on Sales Growth and the market’s higher valuation of their firms to motivate more frequent alliances.   
The variable COMP, which assesses the extent of competition faced by firms attempting alliances, is positive 
and statistically significant for firms which attempt one and one or two alliances.  The COMP variable is 
expected to affect alliances guided more by the exploitative motive than the explorative motive with the 
smaller firms being more affected by this consideration.  
Our study documents the frequency distribution of multiple alliances, evaluates the evolution of 
announcement-period returns as firms engage in multiple alliances, explores the impact of the motivation for 
the alliances on the returns to subsets of firms which engaged in multiple alliances and attempts to identify 
the characteristics of firms which engage in multiple alliances. 
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